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17 
Lessons from the Dramatists Guild for the 
Platform Economy 
Matthew T. Bodie† 
Even if we are a “nation of employees,”1 we have never labored 
solely through employment. Independent contractors provide 
contractually-based labor but without the employment connection. 
Along with providing capital, owners often work for their businesses, 
especially when they are sole proprietors or partners. Volunteers and 
students labor without pay. The employment relationship is a legal 
construct that designates the rights and responsibilities of a particular 
kind of labor relationship, and, as with most legal categories, its 
boundaries can be fuzzy in places. But this fuzziness heightens the 
stakes when workers fall somewhere along the spectrum between 
employment and another category. Over the years, we have layered an 
ever-growing host of legal obligations on employment—from minimum 
wages and healthcare obligations, to collective bargaining, FICA taxes, 
and the work-for-hire doctrine.2 The question of employment status has 
tremendous legal ramifications. 
Because of the legal importance of the employment category, there 
is significant pressure on businesses to push their workers out of the 
category and escape its attendant costs. Such pressures have existed 
since the New Deal, and the definition of “employee” has changed over 
time in response to shifting political and economic winds.3 There have 
 
 † Callis Family Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law; Visiting Professor, Harvard 
Law School (Fall 2016). My thanks to participants at the 2016 Legal Forum Symposium on “Law 
and the Disruptive Workplace,” particularly Catherine Fisk, for their thoughtful comments. I also 
am obliged for questions and comments from participants at the NYU School of Law’s 68th Annual 
Conference on Labor on “Who Is an Employee, and Who Is the Employer?” Thanks to Jon Jones 
for research assistance, and to the University of Chicago Legal Forum editors for a terrific 
conference and editorial process. 
 1 FRANK TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951) (“We have become a nation of 
employees.”). 
 2 See Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
661, 666–74 (2013). 
 3 See id. at 674–94 (discussing changes in legal definition); see also Thomas J. Power, Fast 
Food Sweatshops: Franchisors as Employers Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 19 CUNY L. 
REV. 337, 340 (2016) (“The FLSA was passed at the height of the New Deal, and in addition to 
articulating a federal minimum wage and overtime protections, the FLSA defined ‘employ’ in a 
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always been industries and employers that label their workers as 
independent contractors despite legal uncertainty over the label, and 
courts have long parsed the definition to determine who is in and who 
is out.4 However, the arrival of the platform economy5 has brought with 
it a new approach to the working relationship—one for which there is 
no firm consensus as to its legal categorization. Lawsuits involving 
Uber and other platform companies continue to proliferate, and few 
suits (if any) have reached resolution.6 The legal category of 
employment is deeply unsettled, and a new approach to the law of 
individual labor may be in the offing. Indeed, we may be heading into a 
“post-employment” economy—a world in which employment is no 
longer a meaningful legal or economic category.7 
Dramatists—those authors who write plays, musicals, or operas for 
performance8—have long existed in the legal and economic nether 
region between the categories of employee and independent contractor. 
Since the 1940s, dramatists have been considered independent 
contractors and have generally owned the copyright to their work.9 
However, dramatists have struggled with the independent contractor 
distinction and have often sought to act collectively in setting the terms 
and conditions for their work. Indeed, officials with the Dramatists’ 
Guild of America (Guild) have bemoaned the inability of dramatists to 
 
supremely expansive way.”). 
 4 Jean Tom, Is a Newscarrier an Employee or an Independent Contractor? Deterring Abuse of 
the “Independent Contractor” Label via State Tort Claims, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 489, 493 (2001) 
(contending that the newspaper industry “actively promotes the idea that its delivery workers are 
independent contractors, even as workers, courts, and the IRS have challenged this practice”). 
 5 See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 89 (2016) (using the term 
“platform economy” while also acknowledging alternative terms such as “the sharing economy,” 
“the peer-to-peer economy,” “the human-to-human economy,” “the on-demand economy,” “the gig 
economy,” and “the Uberization of everything”). But see Steven Greenhouse, The Whatchamacallit 
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/the-whatchama 
callit-economy.html [https://perma.cc/4KPF-XMBP] (“It’s a hip, fast-growing sector of the econ-
omy, filled with headline-grabbing companies: Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, Task Rabbit. But there’s a 
gnawing problem: People aren’t sure what to call it.”). 
 6 Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 578 (2016) (“While many lawsuits have been filed, there have been no 
definitive resolutions . . . .”). 
 7 Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 
101 (1998) (proposing in 1998 that “there is little reason to anticipate either a renaissance of 
collective bargaining or much growth for implicit contracts for career employment”). 
 8 See David Leichtman, Most Unhappy Collaborators: An Argument Against the Recognition 
of Property Ownership in Stage Directions, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 683, 684 (1996) (defining 
dramatist or dramatic author as “a playwright, or in the context of a musical or opera, the 
combination of composer, lyricist and bookwriter”). 
 9 Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 652 (2d Cir. 1945) (finding that the labor exception to antitrust 
does not apply because dramatists were independent contractors); Jessica Litman, The Invention 
of Common Law Play Right, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1419–20 (2010) (discussing the genesis 
of the industry consensus surrounding dramatists’ ownership of the copyright). 
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set minimum terms as a group,10 and Congress has considered 
legislation to allow them to pursue collective representation, 
bargaining, and minimum terms agreements.11 Dramatists are pulled 
by competing desires: they want the power of collective action when 
negotiating with others, but they want to retain their independence as 
artists within a larger process. 
The dramatists’ dilemma—independence and control versus 
solidarity and submersion—reflects the dilemmas posed to workers in 
the new platform economy. Do they revel in the freedom and the 
flexibility that the platform offers? Or do they seek to join together with 
other platform laborers in getting a better deal? The categories of 
independent contractor and employee are thus neither legally 
irrelevant nor archaic; they are instead a useful proxy for determining 
which way platform employees can and should structure their labor 
relationships. If platform workers want to prioritize their 
independence, their control over the work, and their intellectual and/or 
reputational property in their labor, they should choose the 
independent contractor route. But if they are working together for a 
company that exercises control over their jobs and their brand, in ways 
that elevate their collective efforts as a whole, they are working as 
employees. 
This essay explores the dramatists’ employment dilemma and 
explains why this dilemma helps illuminate our thinking about the 
future of employment. Part I discusses the structuring of dramatists’ 
work and compares that structure to those of screenwriters and literary 
authors. Part II discusses the platform economy and the reasons why 
platform workers are causing such categorization issues. Finally, Part 
III discusses how issues surrounding platform workers are reflected in 
the dramatists’ dilemma, and how that dilemma should inform the 
economic structuring and legal categorization of platform jobs. 
 
 10 See John Weidman, The Seventh Annual Media and Society Lecture: Protecting the 
American Playwright, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 640 (2007) (discussing the DGA’s role in “the 
development of a series of standard contracts the terms of which have guaranteed to playwrights 
the ability to control the content of the plays which they write, to control the disposition of those 
plays, and to earn a living from those plays if and when they are produced”); see also Ashley Kelly, 
Bargaining Power on Broadway: Why Congress Should Pass the Playwrights Licensing Antitrust 
Initiative Act in the Era of Hollywood on Broadway, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 877 (2008); Alison Zamora, 
The Playwright Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Empowering the “Starving Artist” Through the 
Convergence of Copyright, Labor, and Antitrust Policies, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 395 
(2006). 
 11 See Kelly, supra note 10, at 905–15 (discussing proposed congressional legislation between 
2001 and 2004, such as the Fair Play for Playwrights Act of 2001 and the Playwrights Licensing 
Antitrust initiative (PLAI) Act of 2004). 
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I.  THE DRAMATISTS’ DILEMMA 
Dramatists are authors of dramatic works. They include 
playwrights, composers, lyricists, and bookwriters. Dramatic works can 
stand on their own as literature; the plays of William Shakespeare and 
Tennessee Williams still enjoy brisk sales. However, such works are 
ultimately written to be produced. The dramatic text is meant to be 
spoken in a live theater; the sheet music is meant to be played by 
instruments and sung by voices. The dramatist is thus at once an 
independent artist and a collaborator on a team production.12 
Although the law is now seemingly settled that dramatists are 
independent contractors (and not employees), the economic reality has 
long been somewhat murkier. In fact, dramatists originally organized 
as employees, with the Dramatists Guild serving as a labor union.13 The 
Guild primarily sought, and has since zealously defended, the 
dramatists’ continuing intellectual property (IP) rights over their 
work.14 The means for promoting these rights, along with other 
contractually-based minimums, had been the Guild’s Minimum Basic 
Agreement. In the early days of Broadway, the Guild negotiated with 
theater producers to adopt the Agreement for their productions. Like 
other collective bargaining agreements, the Agreement set forth 
required terms such as minimum royalties, lengths of terms, and a 
grievance-arbitration system to cover disputes.15 In Ring v. Spina,16 
however, a producer challenged the Agreement in court on antitrust 
grounds, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a 
pre-trial injunction against the enforcement of the Agreement.17 As part 
of its ruling, the court cast doubt on the idea that dramatists were 
employees and producers employers: 
 
 12 Shakespeare himself was a founding member of an acting company as well as a shareholder 
in the Globe Theatre. Diana Price, Evidence for A Literary Biography, 72 TENN. L. REV. 111, 133–
34 (2004). 
 13 Ring, 148 F.2d at 651 (“The Guild contends, however, that it is a labor union . . . .”). 
 14 Litman, supra note 9, at 1386 (“The strong copyright-like rights that playwrights enjoy 
today are chiefly contractual, secured for them in 1926 by the collective action of members of the 
Dramatists’ Guild, who claimed to be a labor union and thus entitled to an antitrust exemption.”). 
 15 Ring, 148 F.2d at 649 (“The Basic Agreement, among other things, fixes the minimum terms 
under which the Guild permits any of its members to lease or license a play, including the 
minimum advance payments and the minimum royalties to be paid by a manager. It limits 
contracts by both managers and authors to those made under its own terms, and between 
managers and members, both of whom are ‘in good standing’ with the Guild. It also provides that 
any dispute shall be finally adjudicated by arbitration.”). 
 16 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 17 Id. at 650. 
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[N]one of the parties affected are in any true sense employees. 
An author writing a book or play is usually not then even in any 
contractual relation with his producer. If and when he does 
contract, he does not continue in the producer’s service to any 
appreciable or continuous extent thereafter. . . . The minimum 
price and royalties provided by the Basic Agreement, unlike 
minimum wages in a collective bargaining agreement, are not 
remuneration for continued services, but are the terms at which 
a finished product or certain rights therein may be sold. And no 
wages or working conditions of any group of employees are 
directly dependent on these terms. We think the [labor] 
exception [to federal antitrust laws] therefore inapplicable.18 
The Ring court’s conception of dramatists’ employment status has held 
throughout the years, albeit without direct reaffirmation.19 When the 
Guild was sued for antitrust violations in the 1980s, the court ruled 
against the motion to dismiss,20 and the Guild and the League of New 
York Theatres and Producers eventually settled the case by 
promulgating an Approved Production Contract for Plays and Musical 
Plays (APC).21 However, this model agreement is not binding on the 
parties; it represents only suggested terms.22 Because the Guild could 
 
 18 Id. at 652. 
 19 Federal courts have relied on the dramatists’ precedent to hold that composers are 
independent contractors. See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(“Indeed, the record suggests that the composers contract for a specific output, work at their own 
pace at home, and are not subject to day-to-day supervision by the producers. It may be, 
consequently, that the producer has no right to control the manner in which work is performed, so 
that . . . the composers are independent contractors.”); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 
F.R.D. 59, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same). However, stage directors have been held to be employees. 
See Julien v. Soc’y of Stage Directors & Choreographers, Inc., No. 68 CIV. 5120, 1975 WL 957, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1975) (“In sharp contrast to the playwrights in the Ring case and the lyricists 
in the Bernstein case, we think that defendant here demonstrated at trial that directors are 
employees of producers. It became clear to us during the course of the trial that the producer has 
the right to and does exercise control over all facets of a production and of the director’s work.”). 
 20 Barr v. Dramatists Guild, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). (“Whether a 
particular group of individuals is entitled to claim the labor exemption from the antitrust laws 
cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss.”). 
 21 See Leslie Bennetts, Writers and Producers Reach Contract Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 
1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/02/27/arts/writers-and-producers-reach-contract-accord.html 
[https://perma.cc/5262-TTJ6]. 
 22 Id. (“While the new agreement was unanimously approved by the executive committee of 
the League and the full council of the Guild, like the old contract it carries no force of law. Industry 
observers expressed uncertainty over the degree to which the new contract would succeed in 
standardizing agreements in an arena where there have long been wide discrepancies based on 
the respective strength of negotiating parties.”); see also DONALD C. FARBER, PRODUCING THEATRE: 
A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL AND BUSINESS GUIDE 39 (3d ed. 2006) (“The net effect has been an 
erosion of the strict control that the Guild had been able to impose on First-Class Production 
contract terms in the past.”). 
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still potentially be liable for antitrust violations for subsequent 
restraints of trade, it cannot advocate for any changes to the APC 
without the producers’ approval. With the producers showing no 
interest in any changes, the APC has not been modified since its 
original creation in 1985.23 
The tortured history of the Guild’s negotiations and litigation with 
the consortium of mainline producers, now known as the Broadway 
League,24 demonstrates the dilemma facing dramatists as they seek to 
manage their relationships with producers. The Guild was formed as a 
union, repeatedly asserted that it was a union, and now laments that it 
cannot serve as a union. Like most unions, the Guild sought to provide 
a standardized basic agreement that would set minimum terms for the 
industry, and individual dramatists would then be free to negotiate 
higher terms based on their individual market power. However, 
because of the legal determination that dramatists are not employees, 
the Guild cannot exercise the powers of representation and collective 
bargaining.25 
If the Dramatists Guild did have these powers, however, it might 
very well use them to reinforce the independence of dramatists. In 
discussing the terms that dramatists should incorporate into their 
contracts, the Guild emphasizes above all else the importance of 
keeping copyright over dramatic works as a way of maintaining artistic 
integrity. The Guild’s “Bill of Rights” states in its preamble: “In order 
to protect the dramatist’s unique vision, which has always been the 
strength of the theatre, s/he needs to understand this fundamental 
principle: dramatists own and control their work.”26 Former Guild 
President John Weidman described the principle this way: “The 
playwright’s undisputed ownership of his play, legally and 
artistically . . . has been the bedrock constant around which all theater-
making has been organized.”27 Laying out this principle more 
 
 23 See Kelly, supra note 10, at 904 (“[T]he Dramatists Guild continues to be prevented from 
negotiating the APC by collective bargaining.”) 
 24 The League changed its name in 2007. Andrew Gans, League of American Theatres and 
Producers Announces Name Change, PLAYBILL (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.playbill.com/article/ 
league-of-american-theatres-and-producers-announces-name-change-com-146262 [https://perma. 
cc/H9G8-R4JT]. The League represents theatre owners and producers, Broadway presenters, 
general managers, and other Broadway industry professionals. Id. It negotiates with unions 
representing theater employees such as actors, musicians, choreographers, and stagehands. 
 25 See ROBERT M. JARVIS ET. AL., THEATER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 80 (2004) (“Because 
producers typically have the upper hand in negotiations, the [Dramatists] Guild has wanted to 
engage in collective bargaining but cannot do so—as a trade association rather than a labor union, 
its activities are not shielded from the federal anti-trust laws.”). 
 26 Dramatists Guild, Bill of Rights (last visited Jan.13, 2017), http://www.dramatistsguild. 
com/billofrights/ [https://perma.cc/2HTE-PUUW]. 
 27 Weidman, supra note 10, at 641. 
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specifically, the Guild’s Bill of Rights instructs dramatists: “You own 
the copyright of your dramatic work. Authors in the theatre business do 
not assign (i.e., give away or sell in entirety) their copyrights, nor do 
they ever engage in ‘work-for-hire.’”28 Public performance rights to one’s 
dramatic property are only to be leased “for a finite period of time.”29 
The Bill of Rights further states: “You own all approved revisions, 
suggestions, and contributions to the script made by other collaborators 
in the production, including actors, directors, and dramaturgs. You do 
not owe anyone any money for these contributions.”30 The playwright, 
composer, or lyricist stands alone in her control over the dramatic 
work—at least, in the conception of the Guild. 
However, modern theater production has put increasing strains on 
this ideal of independence. Movie studios such as Disney and 
DreamWorks have brought successful motion picture franchises, such 
as The Lion King and Shrek, to Broadway.31 These studios own the 
intellectual property that forms the foundation for these productions. 
Moreover, films have long been produced with very different 
expectations on the allocation of IP rights. In a marked break from the 
dramatists’ approach, screenwriters have long ceded their copyright to 
the studios and producers that employ them.32 They have been firmly 
encamped in the “employee” category from the beginning and have 
bargained with the studios through their union, the Writers Guild of 
America (WGA).33 Rather than retaining copyright, screenwriters 
receive residuals through a complicated formula that is continually 
renegotiated over time.34 The WGA’s Minimum Basic Agreement (MBA) 
also provides for minimum compensation for screenwriting work such 
as completed drafts,35 as well as processes for regaining certain IP 
 
 28 Dramatists Guild, supra note 26. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Kate Feldman, ‘Shrek,’ ‘The Lion King’ and the Movies that Moved from Animation to 
Broadway, on the 15th Anniversary of the Big Green Ogre, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 18, 2016), http:// 
www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/movies-moved-animation-broadway-article-1.2639967 [htt 
ps://perma.cc/AZ8T-BCZN]. 
 32 See Catherine L. Fisk, Will Work for Screen Credit: Labour and the Law in Hollywood, in 
HOLLYWOOD AND THE LAW 235, 240 (2015) (“Writers first agreed to give up the copyright in their 
work in the very early history of film production . . . .”). However, as Fisk points out, the work-for-
hire bargain “occasionally . . . has been criticized and questioned.” Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. at 244–48 (discussing the origin of residuals and their increasing scope of coverage 
to include television broadcasts, DVD sales, and the internet). 
 35 Catherine L. Fisk, The Role of Private Intellectual Property Rights in Markets for Labor and 
Ideas: Screen Credit and the Writers Guild of America, 1938-2000, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
215, 276 (2011) (“Through control of screen credit and the compensation that turns on it, the 
Writers Guild has created a system of private intellectual property rights that is as important as 
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rights over time and determining authorship of jointly written works.36 
The WGA’s arbitration system for establishing screen credits—and 
thereby not only residuals but also public recognition—is arguably the 
union’s most important contribution to its members.37 
Dramatists have derided the screenwriting system as a devil’s 
bargain in which artistic control is given away for mammon: 
As legal author of the film, that studio can change the content of 
the screenwriter’s script at will. His pirate captain can become a 
teenage runaway, his teenage runaway a Cocker Spaniel, his 
original story, set in Boston during the War of 1812, can be 
moved to the fifth moon of Jupiter. 
Sooner or later, things like this will happen, because things like 
this always happen, and when they do, the screenwriter will feel 
talentless, humiliated, and, most importantly, every single 
author’s impulse that made him want to be a writer in the first 
place will be ground into the dust. 
. . . . 
So why would anyone choose to write for the movies when they 
could write for the theater? The answer is—as it so often is—
money.38 
This clash of cultures can be seen in the movie production of Broadway 
hit Into the Woods. Speaking to an audience of high school drama 
teachers, composer and lyricist Stephen Sondheim confessed that 
Disney had pressed for changes for their movie version, including 
cutting one song and sparing one character from death.39 A furor 
resulted over this instance of Hollywood messing with the singular 
work of one of Broadway’s most revered talents.40 Sondheim was 
 
copyright to the operation of both labor and product markets in Hollywood.”). 
 36 Id. at 262, 266. Fisk provides a comprehensive account of the WGA’s approach in her new 
book. CATHERINE L. FISK, WRITING FOR HIRE: UNIONS, HOLLYWOOD, AND MADISON AVENUE 144–
168 (2016). 
 37 Id. at 235; see also John August & Craig Mazin, Scriptnotes Ep. 20: How Credit Arbitration 
Works, Transcript for Scriptnotes Podcast, Jan. 18, 2012, https://johnaugust.com/2012/scriptnotes-
ep-20-how-credit-arbitration-works-transcript [https://perma.cc/254K-5PC8] (discussing arbitra-
tion system for screenwriting credit). 
 38 Weidman, supra note 10, at 641–42. 
 39 Larissa MacFarquhar, Master Class, NEW YORKER (June 23, 2014), http://www.newyorker. 
com/magazine/2014/06/23/master-class-4 [https://perma.cc/2TNU-4DKY]. 
 40 Margaret Lyons, Sondheim Corrects Record on Into the Woods Changes, VULTURE (June 23, 
2014), http://www.vulture.com/2014/06/sondheim-corrects-record-on-into-the-woods-edits.html [ht 
tps://perma.cc/FFG3-UBUF]. 
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eventually moved to say that he and the show’s original book author 
“worked out every change from stage to screen with the producers 
and . . . the director,” and that “the collaboration was genuinely 
collaborative and always productive.”41 In other words, Disney was not 
in charge. 
With such a strong cultural commitment to individual control, 
dramatists have often conflicted with other artisans and laborers in the 
theater industry. Dramaturgs are editors and/or managers who work 
with the dramatist, generally for a fee, to create the final product, but 
they have not been afforded any copyright participation.42 One 
dramaturg—a playwriting professor—sued the estate of playwright 
Jonathan Larson for co-authorship status for the musical Rent.43 Even 
though the professor allegedly participated in a “radical transformation 
of the show,” the Second Circuit held that the pair intended to have a 
traditional dramatist-dramaturg relationship, not one of co-
authorship.44 Stage directors and choreographers have mounted a more 
sustained effort to obtain copyright protections for their stage directions 
and specific choreography for a particular production.45 Although these 
rights do not infringe upon the dramatist’s rights to the play itself, they 
complicate the dramatist’s control over future productions.46 As a 
result, it is in dramatists’ interests to concentrate IP rights to the 
production in their own hands. Although the issue of stage direction 
copyright is not completely settled, courts have not found in favor of the 
 
 41 Id. 
 42 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 197 n.5 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted) (“Dramaturgs 
provide a range of services to playwrights and directors in connection with the production and 
development of theater pieces. . . . [T]he role of the dramaturg can include any number of the 
elements that go into the crafting of a play, such as actual plot elements, dramatic structure, 
character details, themes, and even specific language.”). 
 43 Id. at 195. 
 44 Id. at 205. See also Recent Case, Copyright—Joint Authorship—Second Circuit Holds That 
Dramaturg’s Contributions to the Musical Rent Did Not Establish Joint Authorship with 
Playwright-Composer—Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998), 112 HARV. L. REV. 964, 
968–69 (1999) (arguing for a clearer rule to address co-authorship issues). 
 45 Margit Livingston, Inspiration or Imitation: Copyright Protection for Stage Directions, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 427, 429 (2009). 
 46 As David Leichtman explained: 
[D]irectors have sought further power through the courts by alleging intellectual 
property rights in their work. This attempt pits stage directors and dramatists, who 
must work closely together as artists, directly against one another in the legal arena. 
For one thing, if stage directors are found to have rights which survive the closing of a 
production, the publication of dramatic works will be radically affected. The printed 
version of the work, which normally incorporates most aspects of the premiere will cease 
to be a complete record, as it is meant to be, of the “defining” production in which the 
dramatist participated and approved of changes in the staging. 
Leichtman, supra note 8, at 688. 
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stage directors and choreographers.47 Some commentators have even 
argued that stage directions are not copyrightable.48 Thus far, 
dramatists have remained alone in their control and power over the 
intellectual property of the stage. 
The dramatists’ position is enviable and has drawn criticism along 
the line of the “have your cake and eat it too” variety.49 A number of 
prominent legal academics have, in fact, called for a curtailment of 
dramatists’ IP rights in order to provide greater rights or freedoms to 
other participants.50 Dramatists—not surprisingly—see it differently.51 
The independence of a singular author’s vision is still championed.52 
Despite their strong attachment to the notion of the individual artist, 
however, dramatists have still pushed for changes in the law to allow 
greater coordination amongst themselves. One proposed piece of federal 
legislation, the Playwright Licensing Antitrust Initiative (PLAI) Act, 
would have allowed dramatists to bargain collectively over a new 
standard agreement without violating the antitrust laws.53 Even with 
 
 47 See, e.g., Mullen v. Soc’y of Stage Dirs. & Choreographers, No. 06 Civ. 6818, 2007 WL 
2892654 (N.D. Ill Sept. 30, 2007); Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006); Deana S. Stein, “Every Move That She Makes”: Copyright Protection for Stage Directions 
and the Fictional Character Standard, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1571, 1572 (2013) (finding that “no 
court has upheld a copyright claim in stage directions”). 
 48 Leichtman, supra note 8, at 696–707. But see Livingston, supra note 45, at 486 (“Certainly, 
a straightforward application of traditional copyright law would dictate that stage directions are 
subject to copyright protection.”); Stein, supra note 47, at 1574 (arguing that “stage directions can 
be afforded copyright protection in limited instances”). 
 49 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Invention of Common Law Play Right, 25 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1381, 1382–83 (2010) (“Playwrights, finally, insist that other creators who contribute 
significant creative expression to licensed productions of their scripts have added no authorship 
and should receive no copyright protection for their additions.”). 
 50 See, e.g., id. at 1424–25 (arguing that idea of a common law “play right” has been 
exaggerated and overstated); Michael W. Carroll, Copyright’s Creative Hierarchy in the Performing 
Arts, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 797 (2012) (arguing that a dramatist’s “rights of creative control 
are too strong when applied to the performing arts because they fail to take account of the mutual 
dependence between writers and performers to fully realize the work in performance”); Catherine 
Fisk & Alisa Hartz, Fair Treatment of Theatre Labor: A Right to Perform Plays, ONLABOR, 
(June 27, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/06/27/fair-treatment-for-theatre-labor-a-right-to-perform 
-plays/ [https://perma.cc/285H-BQJ2] (making the case for a statutory license to perform plays as 
a way of limiting dramatists’ power over performances). 
 51 Leichtman, supra note 8, at 726 (“To reinvest them with the strong grant originally 
intended by the copyright law, dramatists should be relieved of the fear that their collaborators 
are lurking in the shadows with a pencil and a script.”). 
 52 See, e.g., U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HEARING, S. 2349: The Playwrights 
Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the Future of American Live Theater, 108th Cong., 
2d Sess., April 28, 2004, p. 12 (testimony of Wendy Wasserstein) (“[T]he independent voice that 
makes writing for the theater so compelling has become more and more endangered as the 
production of plays are [sic] increasingly dominated by corporate interests.”). 
 53 PLAYWRIGHT LICENSING ANTITRUST INITIATIVE ACT OF 2005, H.R. 532, 109th Cong. (2005); 
PLAYWRIGHT LICENSING ANTITRUST INITIATIVE ACT OF 2004, S. 2349, 108th Cong. (2004). 
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bipartisan support, however, the legislation has not been passed. The 
dramatists’ dilemma persists. 
II. PLATFORM WORKERS AND THE EMPLOYMENT CONUNDRUM 
The New Deal labor and employment legislation made employment 
status into a significant legal category. Employees are generally defined 
by the “control” test.54 The test finds its historical roots in the definition 
of “servant” in English common law. According to the Restatement 
Second of Agency, “[a] servant is a person employed to perform services 
in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct 
in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or 
right to control.”55 Acknowledging that the concept of employment is 
“one not capable of exact definition,”56 the Restatement provides ten 
factors to fill out the basic control standard.57 The control test is used 
both in the common law and for most federal and state statutes and 
regulations.58 In the wake of the New Deal, there was the possibility of 
a broader approach: the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did not 
 
 54 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (quoting Community for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–740 (1989)) (“In determining whether a hired 
party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right 
to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.”); cf. Bodie, supra note 2, 
at 675 (“The ‘control’ test is the dominant standard for employment, both nationally and 
internationally.”); Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Character- 
ization of Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 367 (2002) (“Control/ 
subordination is still the leading (and sometimes the single) characteristic of employment 
relationships in many countries.”). 
 55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1957). 
 56 Id. § 220 cmt. c. 
 57 Id. § 220(2). These factors are: 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the 
details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the 
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist 
without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the 
employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for 
the person doing the work; (f ) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) 
the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work 
is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe 
they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or 
is not in business. 
Id. The Restatement Third of Agency has adapted the language of these doctrines by changing 
“servant” to “employee,” but the doctrines remain relatively the same. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006). 
 58 The Supreme Court has made the common-law “control” test into the default test for 
“employee” whenever used without further explanation in a federal statute. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 
739–40 (“In the past, when Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have 
concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as 
understood by common-law agency doctrine.”). 
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specifically exclude independent contractors, and so-called “newsboys” 
were held to be statutory employees for purposes of the Act, even 
though they were considered independent contractors under common 
law.59 However, the NLRA was amended in 1947 to specifically exclude 
independent contractors from coverage.60 There is one statutory 
alternative to the control test—the “economic realities” or “economic 
dependence” test, which is used by the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
the Family & Medical Leave Act. Because these statutes specifically 
define “employ” to include “suffer or permit to work,”61 the definition of 
employee includes workers beyond the reach of the common law agency 
test.62 The economic realities test thereby covers poorer or less 
economically independent workers, even if their working relationship is 
legally structured to provide less control to the hiring party.63 
Over time, different sets of workers have fallen into the gap 
between the “employee” category and the “independent contractor” 
category. The aforementioned newsboys were an early example. More 
recently, delivery drivers have experienced a wave of litigation over 
their employment status, as FedEx and other companies have tried to 
restructure the relationship to make the drivers independent 
contractors.64 Even exotic dancers have had their employment status 
litigated.65 However, the emergence of “platform,” “on-demand 
economy,” “sharing economy,” or “gig economy” workers has offered a 
new and purportedly existential challenge to the legal concept of 
employment. Rather than providing their services directly to a firm, 
platform workers are matched with a consumer of their services 
through an internet intermediary. These intermediaries describe 
themselves as matching services, rather than employers. For example, 
the ride-sharing services Uber and Lyft do not, they argue, hire drivers 
to provide rides on the companies’ behalf; rather, they provide a 
 
 59 N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 127 (1944) (holding that the news 
vendors in question were “subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute was 
designed to eradicate”). 
 60 Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 141-87 (1988)). 
 61 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 
 62 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting that the FLSA 
“stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a 
strict application of traditional agency law principles”); see also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. 
Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985) (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 
U.S. 28, 33 (1961)) (“The test of employment under the Act is one of economic reality . . . .”). 
 63 See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that 
migrant pickle harvesters were employees under the FLSA). 
 64 Bodie, supra note 2, at 718–20. 
 65 McFeeley v. Jackson St. Ent., LLC, 825 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 2016). 
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platform for drivers and riders to match up with each other for mutually 
beneficial transactions.66 In suits against the ride-sharing services, 
however, representatives for classes of these drivers have characterized 
themselves as traditional employees, albeit with untraditional firm 
architecture.67 
These platform workers—which also include coders, data-entry 
providers, home repair servicers, and deliverers—have created conflict 
over their appropriate legal categorization. Their jobs are flexible and 
allow the worker (within certain incentive schemes) to choose when to 
work. Some commentators have argued that the platform workers are 
straightforward employees.68 Others have argued that on-demand 
workers have sufficient flexibility in their work to qualify as 
independent contractors.69 Still others have argued for a third category 
of workers, neither employees nor independent contractors, to cover this 
new category of work.70 Much of the litigation surrounding this issue is 
still in stasis.71 The confusion of courts over this question is represented 
in this quote by Judge Chhabria: “[T]he jury in this case will be handed 
a square peg and be asked to choose between two round holes.”72 
Like the dramatists, platform workers fall into a gray area between 
the categories of independent contractor and employee. The history of 
the dramatists—in both economic negotiations and litigation 
maneuvers—has applications for how we should characterize platform 
workers going forward. 
III.  LESSONS FROM THE DRAMATISTS FOR PLATFORM WORKERS 
Employment is about team production. Employees are part of an 
economic firm; they have removed themselves from the traditional 
 
 66 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(describing Uber’s contentions about its relationship with its drivers), vacated, No. 13-cv-03826-
EMC, 2016 WL6997166 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 67 See id. at 1137, 1148–52. (describing whether the relationship between Uber and its drivers 
satisfies the “control” test). 
 68 See, e.g., Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms As 
Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 619, 636–41 
(2016); Julia Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm? The Postindustrial Corporation and 
Advanced Information Technology, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (2017). 
 69 See Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1511, 1541 (2016). 
 70 See, e.g., SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR 
MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 
(2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_cen 
tury_work_krueger_harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KH5-PSG9]. 
 71 Cherry, supra note 6, at 578. 
 72 Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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market contracting process and instead provide their labor as part of a 
firm.73 The firm is the mechanism by which production can be 
coordinated amongst many when their inputs are not easily 
distinguishable in the final product.74 Employees participate in this 
ongoing joint production as part of the firm through the employment 
relationship.75 
Dramatists are not employees because they operate outside of the 
team production process in significant respects. True, dramatists must 
collaborate with numerous participants—directors, actors, stagehands, 
funders, choreographers—in bringing a theater production to life. But 
dramatists stand apart in one important respect: they retain 
intellectual property rights over their dramatic works. Because they 
hold copyright to their plays and musicals, they have the traditional 
ownership prerogatives of control over use and profits. This difference 
between dramatists and screenwriters is a critical one. Screenwriters 
typically do not retain their copyright; these rights are either sold with 
the script, if written independently, or go directly to the screenwriter’s 
employer if the script was written through a work-for-hire relationship. 
Screenwriters thus become part of a team; their work is owned by the 
firm that is producing the movie, whether it be a production company 
or a studio.76 Dramatists, on the other hand, may license their work for 
a particular production, but their Guild expects them to retain 
copyright. The dramatists’ intellectual property rights over their work 
has been “the bedrock constant around which all theater-making has 
been organized.”77 
This retention of intellectual property rights has important 
ramifications for team production and the working relationship. We 
manage most business enterprises through firms because we need firms 
to manage the process of production and then manage the distribution 
of the gains from that process.78 Screenwriters put their contributions 
 
 73 For further development of this concept, see Bodie, supra note 2. 
 74 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972) (defining team production as “production in 
which 1) several types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs 
of each cooperating resource”). 
 75 Bodie, supra note 2, at 705–06. 
 76 Fisk, supra note 32, at 240 (“Knowing that film and TV are collaborative media in which 
authorship is collective, [screenwriters] are willing to trade ownership of the copyright in their 
work for access to the resources and collaborations that will get their ideas made into movies or 
TV shows.”). 
 77 Weidman, supra note 10, at 641. 
 78 Under the Alchian and Demsetz definition, team production takes several types of resources 
and then creates a product that is not “a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource.” 
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 74, at 779. 
02 BODIE PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/17  8:15 PM 
17] LESSONS FROM THE DRAMATISTS GUILD 31 
 
into the team’s overall mix of resources and generally do not retain any 
ongoing copyright powers. As such, they are stuck in the muck with 
everyone else and must depend on the firm to manage the distribution 
of gains. Dramatists, on the other hand, seek to pull out their 
contribution from the team process and keep that for themselves. Their 
intellectual property rights allow them to keep their input separate in 
important respects. As such, they stand outside the team—and are not 
considered employees. 
There are certain practical differences between playwriting and 
screenwriting that lend themselves to the different postures that these 
artists take. Plays are more of a stand-alone product; they enjoy at least 
a limited independent market of readers, and they can be produced over 
and over again by different sets of actors, directors, and producers. 
Screenplays, on the other hand, do not have significant stand-alone 
value and are almost always only produced once. But at the same time, 
both the dramatist and the screenwriter depend on a host of other 
participants to bring their words to life. A play cannot be truly 
appreciated unless it is put on stage. If they chose to, dramatists could 
consign themselves to a team production process by handing over their 
IP rights to a firm.79 But as currently constructed, dramatists are not 
employees because they keep their contributions separable from the 
team. 
Platform workers are not generally in a position to retain 
continuing property rights, intellectual or otherwise, over their work. 
But the concept of team production remains critical to determining 
whether they are employees or independent contractors. If the platform 
worker can separate out some portion of the value of her labor and can 
use it separately from the team, that worker is more likely to be 
independent from the team and therefore not an employee. On the other 
hand, if the workers’ contributions inure to the good of the team and 
primarily benefit the team going forward, then employment is more 
apropos. This contrast will generally play out in the piece of ongoing 
“property” that is relevant to most businesses: goodwill, brand, and 
reputation. Instead of having a play or music to provide continuing 
value from past labor, most employees will look to their past experience, 
successful job performance, customer relationships, and co-worker 
reputation as part of their “individual capital” that they carry forward. 
If this capital generally goes to the firm’s reputational capital, then the 
 
 79 Even novelists can work as part of a team, and a firm can own the novel’s copyright. See 
Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1684–86 (2013) 
(discussing the collaborative production of novels through which the firm owns the copyright and 
is considered the author). 
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worker is an employee. If the worker pulls out this reputational capital 
for herself, then she is an independent contractor. 
Uber provides an example of the difference between employee and 
independent contractor in the platform economy. Uber drivers do create 
individual reputational capital through their labor. Their first names 
appear to customers; they are individually rated by customers, and that 
rating appears as part of their profile; and they interact personally with 
customers and can establish a relationship.80 However, most of the 
reputational capital that drivers accrue is going to benefit the team—
Uber. Customers use the Uber app, and the app controls the pool of 
drivers that can be chosen. Customers see only first names of drivers 
and are not given any contact information for drivers.81 Uber takes 
significant steps to vet its drivers and requires background checks and 
car inspections.82 Those certifications as well as a driver’s customer 
ratings are not portable; they are usable only through Uber. Uber’s goal 
is not to create relationships between customers and individual drivers; 
it is to create relationships between customers and Uber. Thus, even 
though drivers are individually providing rides to customers and 
getting paid for each ride, their contributions to the team are not 
separable in the ways that the dramatists’ contributions are. Individual 
drivers are not providing rides as themselves; they are providing rides 
as Uber drivers. As one court described it, “Uber is deeply involved in 
marketing its transportation services, qualifying and selecting drivers, 
regulating and monitoring their performance, disciplining (or 
terminating) those who fail to meet standards, and setting prices.”83 
Uber’s driving services are provided through the team, and the team 
receives the ongoing reputational capital. This critical distinction is 
what makes Uber drivers employees.84 
Uber could structure itself in a way that made the drivers more 
akin to independent contractors. It could construct its app more like a 
marketplace for individual drivers, in which each driver set the rates, 
 
 80 See Cherry, supra note 6, at 597; Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform 
Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 490–91 (2016); Tomassetti, supra 
note 68, at 9. 
 81 Aslam, Farrar & Others v. Uber, Case No. 2202550/2015, U.K. Employment Tribunal, 
¶¶ 90–91, Oct. 28, 2016, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/aslam-and-far 
rar-v-uber-reasons-20161028.pdf [https://perma.cc/247A-LQKD] (discussing absence of informa-
tion between driver and passenger); Tomassetti, supra note 68, at 25 (discussing Uber process). 
 82 Rogers, supra note 80, at 490–91. 
 83 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 84 See also Guy Davidov, The Status of Uber Drivers: A Purposive Approach, SPAN. LAB. L. & 
EMP. REL. J. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2877134 [https://perma.cc/L7DB-QA 
RZ] (describing Uber drivers as employees based on their democratic deficits and economic 
dependence). 
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established the ground rules for the ride, and received independent 
reputational capital that was portable to other transportation markets. 
Customers would be looking for individual drivers and would view Uber 
as more of a market: a food court with different offerings from different 
vendors. Instead, Uber offers the Uber experience, and customers rely 
on Uber to make sure that experience is provided. 
The platform economy’s radical technological changes do allow for 
teams to break down more easily into individual actors, and for those 
individual actors to act independently within the platform. But the 
nature of companies such as Uber and the businesses that they are in 
makes it more likely for them to orient themselves toward team 
production rather than individual markets. Customers generally do not 
want to have to vet a set of drivers individually; they want Uber to do 
it for them. They do not want to establish relationships with specific 
drivers; they want to have a driver available as soon as possible by 
drawing from a large pool.85 Uber is a transportation company, not a 
technology company, and it is hard to imagine it being successful if it 
were to reconstruct itself as a pure market. But other platform 
companies may be able to work as a market more successfully and 
thereby create a true marketplace for independent contractors. 
Even if we ultimately characterize certain platform workers as 
independent contractors, we may still find aspects of the dramatists’ 
dilemma: a need, or at least a desire, to provide them with certain of 
the protections generally afforded to employees. And we may conclude 
that it makes sense to carve out a middle ground between employees 
and independent contractors with respect to certain legal doctrines. The 
Dramatists Guild seeks to obtain the collective-bargaining protections 
afforded to employee unions in order to negotiate more forcefully with 
producers and enforce standard terms and conditions for dramatists’ 
work. The Guild has pursued legislation amending antitrust laws to 
permit dramatists to negotiate collectively, even if they are not 
employees. Such concerns could also apply to platform workers who 
may be considered independent but similarly wish to band together for 
bargaining purposes.86 We may find that various aspects of the 
employment relationship fit broader or narrower categories, and should 
 
 85 See Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Anti-Uber, NEW YORKER, Oct. 10, 2016, at 40, 45 (noting that 
“customers summoning Ubers want their cars to come quickly” and that the company wants the 
service “to be as reliable as running water”). 
 86 For a discussion of antitrust as applied to Uber, see Sanjukta Paul, Uber as For-Profit 
Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and Its Implications, 38 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, https:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=2817653 [https://perma.cc/5YZA-FTTZ]. 
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be expanded or shrunk as appropriate.87 An “independent worker” 
category may be more appropriate for some employees if it offers a 
better regulatory mix of employer responsibilities.88 The legal and 
economic “disruption” caused by platform companies should prompt a 
reevaluation of specific legal regimes and their fit with the employment 
relationship. 
At the same time, however, it is important not to lose sight of what 
the employment relationship does provide. Employment allows for 
meaningful collaboration on an ongoing basis through firms. Team 
production is difficult to manage through pure market relationships. 
Firms are important within our economy and are likely to remain 
important, even in the face of platform technology. As such, the choice 
between firm and market will remain a significant economic and legal 
choice. We cannot let firms like Uber receive the benefits of team 
production without the concomitant responsibilities. When companies 
choose the firm structure to provide their goods or services, they must 
treat their workers as employees. That remains true even in this new 
economy. 
CONCLUSION 
The critical question to ask when it comes to platform workers is 
this: are they part of a firm or are they working as individual 
businesses? Are they providing their labor as part of a team, or do they 
hold on to individual capital throughout their transactions? The 
dramatists have chosen to conduct their work as separate artists; 
screenwriters, as part of a team. This distinction should provide the 
best way forward as we endeavor to categorize an ever-wider array of 
workers and their work. Once categorized, we need to address their 
needs as workers in tandem with our categorization. Certain 
protections that are currently tied to employment may make more sense 
applied to a broader set of contractual participants. But understanding 
the underlying core of the employment relationship, and categorizing 
workers accordingly, will help us then move on to reassessing labor and 
employment laws and applying them more appropriately to those who 
need their protections. 
 
 87 Cf. Davidov, supra note 54, at 371 (discussing the category of dependent contractors). 
 88 See HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 70. Orly Lobel has recently argued that it makes sense 
to extend certain “employment” laws such as antidiscrimination protections, collective bargaining 
rights, and worker safety regulations to all workers, including independent contractors. Orly 
Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of Employment and Labor Law 9–14, https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2848456 [https://perma.cc/8G8L-QW2J]. 
